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AIRLINE CHALLENGES TO AIRPORT ABUSES OF
ECONOMIC POWER
Roy GOLDBERG*
"0, it is excellent to have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous
to use it like a giant."
- William Shakespeare (Measure for Measure)
A IRPORTS ARE ESSENTIAL facilities for commercial air-
lines. Access to an airport's runways and terminal building
is critical for an airline to serve the relevant geographic and
population markets, as well as to connect through-passengers to
domestic and international flights. This reality imbues airports
with economic power that either constitutes or closely resembles
monopoly power-that is, the power to impose economic rents
and conditions without the check of true competition. Such
power puts many airports in a highly sensitive position: the rates,
charges and other terms and conditions they impose for use of
the airport can dictate whether the airline can serve that airport,
and whether it can do so efficiently and profitably.
A significant number of major airports are operated by re-
sponsible administrators and oversight boards that strive hard to
be fair and reasonable in dealing with the airline industry. Fol-
lowing meaningful consultations, they reach reasonable agree-
ments with airlines as to the rates to be charged for landing fees,
terminal rents and other facilities and services. However, the
exceptions that unfortunately exist can wreak economic havoc
on airlines that fall victim to an airport's abuse of its economic
power. In today's environment, airlines should be especially
wary of the airport that professes to be able to act like a purely
private, commercial landlord-free to act entirely out of its own
selfish, economic interests. Fortunately, in the United States
there are multiple legal tools available to airlines confronted
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with an airport's economically abusive and anticompetitive
conduct.
This article discusses three primary such tools: (1) the
prohibitions against an airport unjustly discriminating against
airlines; (2) the laws that restrict how much airports can charge
airlines for use of the airport; and (3) the relevant antitrust laws.
Airlines should consider all of these tools in seeking to protect
themselves against economically oppressive conduct by airports.
I. THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNJUST
DISCRIMINATION BY AIRPORTS
Although airports in the United States generally are author-
ized to impose rates and charges for use of runways, terminal
buildings, and other airport facilities (either by lease agree-
ments, ordinance, or otherwise), and to impose other condi-
tions for use of the airport, they do not have carte blanche
authority to act like private, commercial landlords. Because air-
ports are essential facilities for airlines (and their passengers),
federal laws place important limits on the exercise of an air-
port's rate-setting and other functions. A paramount limitation
is the law against unjust discrimination among similarly situated
airlines.
A. THE AIRPORT AND AIRWAY IMPROVEMENT ACT,
49 U.S.C. 47107
A primary law in the United States against unjust discrimina-
tion by airports is Section 511 of the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982 ("AAIA"). 1 This law requires airports
that receive federal grants for development projects to charge
"reasonable" fees, and conditions approval of such funding by
the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") upon the air-
port's assurance that "the airport will be available for public use
on reasonable conditions and without unjust discrimination.'2
The Act requires airports to ensure that "air carriers making
I See Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 686 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 47107
(2006)).
2 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) (1) (2006) (emphasis added). In New York Airlines, Inc.
v. Dukes County, the court held that airlines enjoy a private right of action to
challenge an airport's violation of section 511(a) of the AAIA, emphasizing that
the "statute expressly identifies air carriers as the class Congress intended to ben-
efit." N.Y. Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1446 (D. Mass.
1985). However, some other courts have disagreed with and refused to follow
this ruling. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. County of Pitken, 674 F.
352
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similar use of the airport will be subject to substantially comparable
charges.., for facilities directly and substantially related to pro-
viding air transportation . . . .": To the extent that airline te-
nants are subject to different rates and charges, such differences
must be "based on reasonable classifications, such as between
(i) tenants and nontenants; and (ii) signatory and non-
signatory carriers .. .
B. THE DOT POLICY ON AIRPORT RATES AND CHARGES
Section 113 of the Federal Aviation Administration Authoriza-
tion Act of 1994 required the DOT to publish rules or guide-
lines for determining whether an airport fee is "reasonable. 5 In
1996, the Department issued its final Policy Regarding Airport
Rates and Charges ("Policy Statement").6
Supp. 312, 317-18 (D. Colo. 1987); Ne. Jet Ctr. v. Lehigh Northampton Airport
Auth., 767 F. Supp. 672, 685-86 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
3 § 47107(a) (2) (A) (emphasis added).
4 § 47107(a) (2) (B). The original language of the Act is preserved in a Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA") Order:
Each air carrier using such airport (whether as a tenant, nontenant,
or subtenant of another air carrier tenant) shall be subject to such
nondiscriminatory and substantially comparable rates, fees, rentals, and
charges with respect to facilities directly and substantially related to
providing air transportation and other such nondiscriminatory and
substantially comparable rules, regulations, and conditions as are
applicable to all such carriers which make similar use of such airport and
which utilize similar facilities, subject to reasonable classifications such
as tenant or nontenant, and signatory carriers and nonsignatory
carriers. Such classification or status as tenant or signatory shall
not be unreasonably withheld by any airport provided an air carrier
assumes obligations substantially similar to those already imposed
on air carriers in such classification or status.
Fed. Aviation Admin., Airport Compliance Requirements, Order 5190.6A
§ 1-14(a) (Oct. 2, 1989) (emphasis added).
5 49 U.S.C. § 47129(b) (2006).
6 Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,994, 31,994
(June 21, 1996) [hereinafter "Policy Statement"]. As a result of a successful chal-
lenge by the Air Transport Association to portions of the Policy Statement, only
parts of it remain in effect. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of Transp., 119
F.3d 38, 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Policy Statement provided for landing fees
to be derived pursuant to a cost-based approach. Policy Statement, supra, at
32,019-20. By contrast, fees for non-airfield uses, such as hangars and terminals,
could be set by "any reasonable methodology" including, among other things,
appraised fair market value. Policy Statement, supra, at 32,020-21. As discussed
in the text accompanying footnotes 63-64, infra, the court in Air Transport Ass'n
held it was arbitrary and capricious for the DOT to differentiate between airfield
fees and non-airfield fees, and vacated several sections of the Policy Statement,
including Section 2.6, which stated that, "For other facilities and land not cov-
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The Policy Statement sets forth provisions that are designed
to prevent airports from improperly discriminating against air
carriers. Under Section 3, "[a] eronautical fees may not unjustly
discriminate against aeronautical users or user groups."7 To
achieve that objective:
The airport proprietor must apply a consistent methodology in
establishing fees for comparable aeronautical users of the air-
port. When the airport proprietor uses a cost-based methodol-
ogy, aeronautical fees imposed on any aeronautical user or group
of aeronautical users may not exceed the costs allocated to that
user or user group under a cost allocation methodology adopted
by the airport proprietor that is consistent with this guidance,
unless aeronautical users otherwise agree.'
Similarly, "costs properly included in the rate base-must be
allocated to aeronautical users by a transparent, reasonable, and
not unjustly discriminatory rate-setting methodology. The
methodology must be applied consistently and cost differences
must be determined quantitatively, when practical."9 Where an
airport charges different rates to airline tenants, there must be a
factual basis for the different treatment." For example, an air-
port typically can charge more to a non-signatory carrier than a
signatory carrier because:
The costs of serving a non-signatory carrier would ordinarily be
higher than a compensatory rate reflecting the costs of serving
exclusively signatory carriers. For example, non-signatory carri-
ers may increase an airport proprietor's risk of revenue fluctua-
tion. The increased risk in turn would justify higher reserves. In
addition, the administrative costs of dealing with non-signatory
carriers would ordinarily be higher. Further, an airport proprie-
tor might be able to argue that due to their irregularity, or rela-
tive infrequency, operations by non-signatory carriers cost more
to serve than a corresponding number of operations performed
on a regular basis by signatory carriers. Each of these considera-
tions would provide a justification for imposing a surcharge, in
some amount, on' non-signatory carriers.
ered by [the section governing fees imposed for use of the airfield], the airport
proprietor may use any reasonable methodology to determine fees, so long as the
methodology is justified and applied on a consistent basis to comparable facilities
.... " Policy Statement, supra, at 32,020-21; see also Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 119
F.3d at 43-44.
7 Policy Statement, supra note 6, at 32,230.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 32,021.
10 See id. at 32,015-16.
354
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In addition, signatory carriers usually assume obligations or re-
sponsibilities that non-signatory carriers do not undertake. Air-
port proprietors receive intangible benefits from having carriers
at the airport undertake these additional responsibilities. A
surcharge for non-signatory carriers may be justifiable, in part, as com-
pensation to the airport proprietor for the reduction in these intangible
benefits when a carrier elects non-signatory status.''
Section 113 also created an expedited procedure for the DOT
to give airlines and airports the ability to obtain prompt resolu-
tion of significant disputes over the reasonableness of new or
increased airport fees. 12 The DOT must determine the reasona-
bleness of a challenged fee or increase within 120 days of the
complaint being filed. 3 However, the statute does not provide a
standard for the DOT to determine the reasonableness of a spe-
cific fee. In order to timely request such a determination of rea-
sonableness under Section 47129, the carriers must file a written
complaint "within 60 days after such carrier receives written no-
tice of the establishment or increase of such fee."' 4 "An airport
owner or operator is considered to have imposed a fee on a car-
rier when it has taken all steps necessary under its procedures to
establish the fee, whether or not the fee is being collected or
carriers are currently required to pay it.' ' 5
C. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
The Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA") contains an explicit
preemption clause that reads: "[A] State . . . may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart."' 6
However, Section 41713 also creates an exception from preemp-
tion for actions involving the exercise of proprietary powers and
rights of "a State, political subdivision of a State, or political au-
thority of at least 2 States that owns or operates an airport .... 17
An airport can be expected to argue that its conduct constitutes
a legitimate exercise of its proprietary powers as the owner and
I Id. (emphasis added).
12 49 U.S.C. § 47129(a)(1) (2006).
13 § 47129 (c) (1).
14 § 47129(a)(1)(B).
15 Rules Applicable to Proceedings Concerning Airport Fees, 14 C.F.R.
§ 302.601(a) (2006).
16 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006).
17 § 41713 (b) (3).
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operator of the airport. For example, in Montauk-Caribbean Air-
ways, Inc. v. Hope, the court found that the town of East Hamp-
ton was exercising its proprietary rights as owner of an airport in
declining to modify a lease."8 However, there is also case law
that supports the finding that airport fees are preempted if they
are discriminatory and therefore not a valid exercise of proprie-
tary powers. 9 Under the proprietary powers exception to the
ADA's general rule of preemption, a state or municipality that
owns or operates an airport "has the power to promulgate rea-
sonable, nonarbitrary and non-discriminatory regulations.
2
"Those regulations must avoid even the appearance of irrational
or arbitrary action."2'
D. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Discrimination against airlines by airports also may violate the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,22 which invalidates
state laws that "interfere with or are contrary to" federal law.23
Congress can preempt state law by an express provision, or an
intent to preempt state law may be inferred where Congress has
enacted a sufficiently comprehensive scheme of federal regula-
tion or where the federal interest is dominant so as to preclude
state legislation in the same area. 4 Where Congress has not ac-
ted to completely supersede regulation by the states, state law is
nullified to the extent that it conflicts with federal law.25 "Chal-
lenges to the actions of airport operators based on the
supremacy clause, including private actions against refusals by
local airport proprietors to grant access to interstate carriers,
have been recognized by the courts. "26
18 Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 96-97 (2d Cir.
1986).




22 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
23 Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 82 (1824)).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 N.Y. Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (D. Mass. 1985)
(citing British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., 564 F.2d 1002, 1010-11
(2d Cir. 1977)); United States v. N.Y., 552 F. Supp. 255, 262-65 (N.D.N.Y. 1982),
affd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983)); see aLto Midway Airlines, Inc. v. County of West-




The Chicago Convention and many of the United States' bi-
lateral air services agreements obligate the United States to en-
sure that airports charge foreign airlines the same fees as the
U.S. airlines that operate similar services. 7 Article 15 of the
Chicago Convention provides:
Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public use
by its national aircraft shall likewise . . .be open under uniform
conditions to the aircraft of all the other contracting States. The
like uniform conditions shall apply to the use, by aircraft of every
contracting State, of all air navigation facilities ....
Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be imposed by
a contracting State for the use of such airports and air navigation
facilities by the aircraft of any other contracting State shall not be
higher,
(a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air
services, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft
of the same class engaged in similar operations, and
(b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air ser-
vices, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft
engaged in similar international air services. 28
In addition, in certain circumstances "the charges imposed for
the use of airports and other facilities shall be subject to review
by the [ICAO] Council .... 9
F. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
In Neiw England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority,
the court held that new landing fees at Boston's Logan Airport
improperly discriminated against general aviation where the ef-
fect of the new fee structure was to drastically increase the land-
ing costs of smaller aircraft while decreasing that of larger
ones.3 0 For example, the landing fee of a Beechcraft 1900
would increase by 306%, while that of a Boeing 747 would de-
crease by 45%.3' The First Circuit stated:
27 Convention on International Civil Aviation preamble, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/
7300_orig.pdf [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
28 Chicago Convention, supra note 27, art. 15.
29 Id.
30 New England Legal Found. v. Mass. Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 169 (1st Cir.
1989).
31 Id. at 159; see also Fed. Aviation Admin., Investigation into Massport's Land-
ing Fees, Docket 13-88-3 (Dec. 22, 1988) (The DOT determined that the method-
ology was unfair, unreasonable, and unjustly discriminatory because it penalized
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The Secretary is required . . . to see that the project for which
federal grant funds are expended "will be available for public use
on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust. discrimination
.... [The applicable law] appears to us to establish as "reasona-
ble" any fee or charge by the airport proprietor which fairly and
rationally reflects the cost-to users Ithat'are comparably situated.
To make such an equation it is essential that a methodology be estab-
lished which is founded upon a principled, non-arbitrary basis.3 2
In New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, the 'carrier sought
damages and injunctive relief because of the refusal by the
Martha's Vineyard Airport Commission to grant it access to the
Martha's Vineyard Airport." New York Air had filed a formal
request for permission to operate at the airport. 4 The Commis-
sion considered the request at a meeting, and.refused to permit
the airline to use the terminal and ramp facilities. 5 The refusal
was based in part on a concern regarding the competition that
would result with Provincetown-Boston Airways ("PBA"), a car-
rier that was already serving the airport, as some Commission
members believed "that the proposed service was unnecessary
since other carriers, including PBA and Brockway Air, already
provided adequate service."3 6 Some members also believed the
airport's facilities could not adequately accommodate New York
Air's larger DC 9-30 aircraft. 7
In denying a motion to dismiss by the airport commissioners,
the court stated:
New York Air alleges facts sufficient to state a claim under Sec-
tion 511(a) of the AlP. The allegation that New York Air was
excluded from the Airport because of pretextual concern with
the adequacy of facilities at the Airport supports the inference, as
alleged, that there was no reasonable basis for the Commission's
action. New York Air also claims that the Commission's refusal
was unfair and discriminatory in that it was allegedly based on
the opinion that existing service at the Airport was adequate and
on concern with the potential effect on competition of New York
Air's proposed service. The effect of the Commission's refusal is,
the smaller business aircraft "'by allocating to them a disproportionate amount
of airport costs."').
32 New England Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 169 (citations omitted; emphasis
added).







arguably, to grant exclusive rights to carriers already providing
service to the Airport. The complaint therefore sufficiently states
a claim under § 1983 for a violation of Section 511(a) of the
AIP. 38
In a case involving Aerolineas Argentinas, the DOT and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit made it clear that
airport fees may not be facially discriminatory against similarly
situated air carriers. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the DOT's deter-
mination that fees imposed on U.S. carriers at the airport in
Buenos Aires that were three times higher than those paid by
the domestic Aerolineas Argenfinas constituted unreasonable
discrimination. 9 The discriminatory situation arose when the
Argentine government unlinked its peso from the U.S. dollar in
early 2002, causing the value of the peso to fall to approximately
33 U.S. cents.4 ° When the Buenos Aires airport attempted to
impose fees in dollars, the Argentine carrier succeeded in per-
suading an Argentine court to enjoin the rule, and the U.S. car-
riers lost their Argentine court battle.4 As a result, Aerolineas
was only required to pay one-third the fees of its U.S.
competitors.42
Responding to a petition filed by U.S. carriers, the DOT
found this to be an "unreasonable discriminatory . . . practice
against" the U.S. carriers.43 It concluded that "'the imposition
of higher fees at Ezeiza airport on U.S. carriers than those paid
by Aerolineas Argentinas constitute [d], on its face, the type of
activity that 49 U.S.C. § 41310 was intended to reach. ' ' 4 4 As a
remedy, Aerolineas could not continue to fly to the United
States unless it placed in escrow, in the United States, the differ-
ence between what it paid in user fees in Argentina and what the
U.S. airlines were paying there.45
38 Id. at 1448.




42 See id. at 2-3.
43 See id. at 3.
44 See id.; 49 U.S.C. § 41310(c) (1) (A)-(d) (1) (2006) (stating "An air carrier...
may file a complaint" which authorizes the DOT to "take actions.. in the public
interest to eliminate an activity of a government of a foreign country that is 'an
unjustifiable or unreasonable discriminatory, predatory, or anticompetitive prac-
tice against an air carrier.'").
45 See Aerolineas Argentinas, 415 F.3d at 2.
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In affirming, the D.C. Circuit rejected the foreign carrier's ar-
gument that conflicting decisions by the Argentine courts do
not amount to a "discriminatory, predatory, or anticompetitive
practice."46 The court pointed to the treaty between Argentina
and the United States, which provided that "[u] ser charges, im-
posed by the competent charging authority of the other Party
shall be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. Airlines shall
not be required to pay charges higher than those paid by air-
lines of the charging Party."4 It added that "Aerolineas of-
fer[ed] no reason to believe the DOT acted unreasonably in
concluding that charging Argentine and United States carriers
different rates was an 'unreasonable discriminatory ... practice'
under section 41310(c)."48
In City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, the court upheld an FAA de-
termination that lease terms for a fixed base operator at the
Pompano Beach Airport were unjustly discriminatory because of
the more favorable terms granted in another lease to a compet-
ing FBO.49 According to the court:
The City attempted to justify each of the discriminatory provi-
sions in the proposed Brettman lease, arguing that they were in-
corporated to protect the City's and thus the public's interest.
These justifications, which might have provided an adequate rea-
son for the City's modification of its standard fixed base operator
lease over time, were insufficient here, in light of the City's con-
duct vis-a-vis Brettman. Key to our affirmance of the hearing of-
ficer's findings and order is the fact that the City's contemporaneous
treatment of the Beckers and Brettman differed so markedly. The City
last amended its lease with John Becker and Pompano Air Center
in November 1978; Brettman applied for a lease May 30, 1979;
the City granted Executive Aviation a lease in July 1979; and the
City then granted Brian Becker a lease in November 1981. The
differences in these leases have already been noted; we find no reasonable
explanation or justification in the record as to why they exist.5 °
The court added:
Contrary to the City's foreboding warning and admonition, our
affirmance of the hearing officer's findings and order is not a
signal to cities and potential lessees of municipal property that all
46 Id. at 4.
47 Id. at 6.
48 Id. at 7.
49 City of Pompano Beach v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 774 F.2d 1529, 1531-32,
37-38 (11th Cir. 1985).
5o Id. at 1544 (emphasis added).
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municipal leases must be identical. We applaud a city's desire to
learn from experience and to be ever watchful for improvements
in the way it does business in order to protect the public's inter-
est; modifications in standard contracts and leases is one way to
accomplish this worthy goal. 5
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., the Fifth Circuit
invalidated an ordinance passed by the cities of Dallas and Fort
Worth that imposed restrictions on airline passenger service
from a particular airport.52 The court held that the ordinance
was not a valid exercise of the cities' proprietary powers and was
preempted by the ADA.
We do not limit the scope of proprietary rights to those which
have been previously recognized. Thus, we are open to assessing
whether the restrictions in the Ordinance are reasonable and
non-discriminatory rules aimed at advancing a previously unrec-
ognized local interest. The Fort Worth petitioners fail, however,
to offer a viable alternative justification for the route limitations
that might support extending the recognized scope of a proprie-
tor's powers under § 4173(b) (3). To allow enforcement of the
Ordinance under the proprietary powers exception extends that
exception beyond its intended limited reach. 54
As the above cases demonstrate, the DOT and the courts are
prepared to protect airlines against unjust discrimination by
airports.
II. OTHER LAWS THAT RESTRICT HOW MUCH
AIRPORTS CAN CHARGE AIRLINES FOR
USE OF THE AIRPORT
While many laws governing airport rates and charges are
aimed at prohibiting unjust discrimination among airlines,
there is also recognition that even nondiscriminatory fees can
be unlawful if they allow the airport to receive more revenue
than is necessary to cover its actual costs.
A. THE ANTI-HEAD TAX ACT, 49 U.S.C. § 40116(E) (2)
Under the Anti-Head Tax Act ("AHTA"), a state or political
subdivision, or any person that has purchased or leased an air-
port, "may not levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other
51 Id. at 1544-45.
52 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 808 (5th Cir. 2000).
53 Id. at 804-05.
54 Id. at 808 (citations omitted).
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charge on (1) an individual traveling in air commerce; (2) the
transportation of an individual traveling in air commerce; (3)
the sale of air transportation; or (4) the gross receipts from that
air commerce or transportation" unless permitted under a pro-
vision in the Act.55 One such provision authorizes airports to
charge "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other ser-
vice charges from aircraft operators for using airport facilities of
an airport owned or operated by [a] State or subdivision. "56
This language applies to airport terminal charges as well as land-
ing fees, and although the AHTA allows only "reasonable" rental
charges, it does not set standards for determining reasonable-
ness of the fees.57
B. DOT POLICY STATEMENT
Under Section 2.2 of the DOT Policy Statement Regarding
Airport Rates and Changes, "[r]evenues from fees imposed for
use of the airfield ('airfield revenues') may not exceed the costs to
the airport proprietor of providing airfield services and airfield
assets currently in aeronautical use unless otherwise agreed to
by the affected aeronautical users. ' 58 The Policy Statement con-
tains several additional provisions which offer specific guidance
as to what an airport can and cannot do in raising funds
through landing and terminal rates and charges. For example,
under Section 2.4.5 (b), which governs the allocation of the capi-
tal costs of facilities used for both aeronautical and non-aero-
nautical uses, "[t]he portion of shared costs allocated to
aeronautical users ... should not exceed an amount that reflects
the respective aeronautical purposes and proportionate aero-
nautical uses of the facility in relation to . . . non-aeronautical
use of the facility. '59 Additionally, "the costs of facilities not yet
built and operating may not be included in the rate base."6°
C. FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Under certain circumstances, a fee imposed on airlines also
may constitute an unlawful taking, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o per-
son shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
55 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b) (2006).
56 § 40116(e)(2).
57 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Kent County, 501 U.S. 355, 365-66 (1994).
58 Policy Statement, supra note 6, at 32,019 (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 32,020.
60 Id.
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process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."6
D. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
In Massachusetts v. 'United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a "flat fee" registration tax imposed by the U.S. government
on all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the
United States was lawful "[s]o long as the charges do not dis-
criminate .... are based on a fair approximation of use of the
system, and are structured to produce revenues that will not ex-
ceed the total cost to the Federal Government of the benefits to
be supplied .... ,62 The Court added that the "requirement that
total revenues not exceed expenditures places a natural ceiling
on the total amount that such charges may generate .... 61
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., the plaintiffs challenged a one dollar charge by state
and municipal authorities "per commercial airline passenger to
help defray costs of airport construction and maintenance."64
The Supreme Court held that such fees did not violate the fed-
eral Constitution, for the same charges were imposed on both
interstate and intrastate flights, and thus they reflected a "fair, if
imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose bene-
fit they [were] imposed," and they were not shown to be exces-
sive in relation to the costs incurred by the taxing authorities.65
During the 1990s, the DOT twice ruled it was unlawful for Los
Angeles International Airport ("LAX") to use fair market value
to determine landing fees.66 In the first proceeding ("LAX I"),
the DOT concluded that "[h]istoric cost is the simplest, most
direct, and easiest-to-verify measure of cost. Moreover, in a reg-
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V (the 14th Amendment applies the same prohibition
to state and local governments).
62 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 466-67 (1978).
63 Id. at 467; see also id. at 463 n.19 (a user fee must be a "fair approximation of
the cost of benefits supplied").
64 Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707, 709 (1972), superseded by statute, Anti-Head Tax Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40116
(2006).
65 Id. at 717-19.
66 Los Angeles Int'l Airport Rates Proceeding, Order 95-6-36, 1995 DOT Av.
LEXIS 391, at *49-50 (Dep't of Transp. June 30, 1995) [hereinafter LAX]] ("Al-
lowing an airport to include an estimated fair market value for airfield land in
the landing fee rate base will enable the airport to recover a surplus above its
airfield costs, which would be contrary to law."); Second Los Angeles Int'l Airport
Rates Proceeding, Order 97-12-31, 1997 DOT Av. LEXIS 673, at *1 (Dep't of
Transp. Dec. 23, 1997) [hereinafter LAX II].
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ulatory system in which the proprietor's revenue is limited to
the costs of providing services, historic cost valuation provides
for full reimbursement of actual costs incurred by the proprie-
tor."6 7 In 1999, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the DOT's ruling that
LAX should calculate landing fees at historical cost, not fair
market value, though not on the assumption in LAX I that his-
toric cost is the exclusive method for determining actual costs.
Instead, the court followed the policy reasons outlined in LAX
II:68
[The] issue is whether the City may include in the landing fee a
rental charge for the airfield land based on the land's estimated
fair market value, that is, whether the charge represents a cost
that may reasonably be imposed on the airlines using the airfield.
In concluding that this charge is unreasonable, we rely on several
factors. Among other things, the charge cannot be justified as
compensation for the airport's opportunity costs in using its land
for airport facilities, since the City made a commitment to con-
tinue using LAX as an airport and the airport's overall revenues
compensate the City for using the land as an airport. There is no
economic policy reason for allowing the use of fair market value,
because the City needs no additional incentive to use its property
at LAX as an airport, for the airport provides significant eco-
nomic benefits to the Los Angeles area. There is also no evi-
dence that the fair market value charge is needed to deter
excessive use of LAX 6 9
As a result of the D.C. Circuit's affirmation, LAX refunded
$112.8 million to various airlines for the landing fee
overcharges.7 0
In 1997, the same court held that it was arbitrary and capri-
cious for the DOT to require that fees charged by airports for
use of the airfield be based on the historic cost of assets while
allowing fees for non-airfield facilities to be based on "any rea-
sonable methodology," including fair market value. 71 The court
stated:
67 LAX I, supra note 66, at *51.
68 City of Los Angeles v. Dep't of Transp., 165 F.3d 972, 975-76 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
69 LAX II, supra note 66, at *3.
70 See DEP'T OF AIRPORTS, L.A. INT'L AIRPORT REFUNDING REVENUE BONDS, AN-
NUAL FIN. INFO. 13 (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www.lawa.org/docs/LAX_
ar2001.pdf.




[E]xperience prior to the Secretary's regulation is not a particu-
larly reliable guide since airports may well have thought that the
statutory limitation (reasonableness) on all airport fees prior to
1994.implied some sort of cost-based methodology.... [B]y link-
ing airfield fees to historic cost and capping airfield fees at total
cost but permitting any reasonable methodology and imposing
no cap for non-airfield fees, the regulation certainly implies that
non-airfield fees need not be cost-based. Nor is the fact that air-
lines typically have reached agreement with airports as to these
fees of any special significance. Airlines have incentives to enter
into agreements with airports, even if they are monopolists. And
an individual airline may not have a large incentive to challenge
the reasonableness of a monopoly rent, since its competitors at
an airport would also be paying the same monopoly rent (by vir-
tue of the prohibition against discriminating among aeronautical
users) ....
It may well be that, as the Secretary suggests, airports would face
some restraint on the exercise of any market power that they
might have. But we do not think the Secretary has adequately
explained how those generally unspecified restraints will ensure,
in the absence of meaningful guidelines, that non-airfield fees
are reasonable.7 2
Late in 2006, and again in March 2007, the airport commis-
sion and the City of Los Angeles once again authorized in-
creases that will more than triple airport rents and other fees
based primarily on the lost income from the airport's common
use areas, which it cannot lease to some other commercial ten-
ant.73 Several affected airlines promptly challenged the fee in-
creases with the DOT, and others filed suit in federal court.7 1
III. THE ANTITRUST LAWS
When airports act in an anticompetitive manner, such con-
duct may also be challenged under the antitrust laws. Section 1
of the Sherman Act makes unlawful any "contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States . . . ." A plaintiff that successfully proves injury
from a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of inter-
72 Id.
73 Ashley Surdin, LAX Terminal Fee Increases Approved, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007,
at B3.
74 Id.
75 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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state commerce may recover three times the amount of actual
economic damages.
7 6
Although airports that are publicly owned may assert that
their conduct is exempt from the antitrust laws, such an argu-
ment is not necessarily fatal to an airline's challenge. In New
York Airlines, the carrier alleged that in refusing to grant it access
to the Martha Vineyard's Airport, the airport commission acted
pursuant to an unlawful conspiracy with other airlines, in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.77 The commission and its
members argued that their refusal to grant access was shielded
from antitrust liability under the so-called "state action" doctrine
recognized in Parker v. Brown7" and its progeny.79
However, the court refused to view Parker as giving airports
carte blanche power to engage in conduct that would violate the
antitrust laws if committed by private parties.80 Rather, for the
Parker exemption to apply, two standards must be met: "First,
the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed as state policy' [and] second, the policy
must be "actively supervised" by the state itself.""' To pass these
tests, "the political subdivision claiming exemption must illus-
trate the requisite legislative intent by demonstrating by con-
vincing reasoning that the challenged restraint is necessary to
the successful operation of the legislative scheme that the state
as sovereign has established.
8 2
The court then observed that the airport commission was au-
thorized by state law to "lease airport facilities, to determine
charges and rentals for the use of airport property, to enter into
contracts and to expend funds for the maintenance, operation
and construction of the airport, and to adopt rules and regula-
tions for the use of the airport to insure the public safety."8"
None of these authorizations demonstrated a clear legislative in-
tent "to displace competition by the provision of monopolistic
public services or to authorize anticompetitive conduct in the
management of the Airport. There [was] no indication that an-
76 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1979).
77 N.Y. Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1440-41 (D. Mass.
1985).
78 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943).
79 N.Y. Airlines, 623 F. Supp. at 1451; see also Parker, 317 U.S. at 360.
80 N.Y. Airlines, 623 F. Supp. at 1451-52.





ticompetitive conduct is necessary to the operation of the statu-
tory scheme. 84 Moreover, there were "no provisions for state
review, nor [were] there other indications that the state [was]
activelysupervising the activities of the Commission pursuant to
state policy .... Under these circumstances, the Commission's
action is not clearly exempt from challenge under the antitrust
laws.""
IV. CONCLUSION
As essential facilities, airports wield a massive amount of eco-
nomic power which, if unchecked, can dramatically impact the
ability of an airline to serve that airport in an efficient and prof-
itable manner. This situation can mean increased difficulties
for airlines as airports attempt to enjoy the benefits of such
power, while trying to resist the fundamental responsibilities
that should coexist and restrain the exercise of such power. Air-
port commissions want to have unfettered discretion to set rates
and charges and impose terms and conditions, while also trying
to perpetuate a fiction that they are private commercial entities
that should be allowed to act in their own economic self-inter-
ests at all times. Fortunately, the United States Congress, courts,
the DOT, and the FAA have put into place a web of laws, poli-
cies, and rulings that an airline can utilize to level the playing
field in airport-airline relations.
84 Id. at 1451-52.
85 Id. at 1452.
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